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Abstract
This paper presents a politico-economic model that includes a mutual link be-
tween life cycle earnings mobility and redistributive politics. The model demon-
strates that when an economy features a high opportunity of upward mobility and
high risk of downward mobility, it attains a unique equilibrium where unskilled,
low-income agents support a low redistribution because of the hope of upward mo-
bility in future. In contrast, the economy attains multiple equilibria when mobility
opportunity and risk are low: one is an unskilled-majority equilibrium dened by
low mobility and the other is a skilled-majority equilibrium dened by high mo-
bility. The paper gives a comparison between the political equilibrium and the
social planner's allocation in terms of mobility, and shows that the skilled-majority
equilibrium realizes mobility close to the optimal one.
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1 Introduction
Expectations of redistribution aect individuals' decisions on educational investment.
Their decisions determine the distribution of skilled and unskilled agents and thus in-
equality among agents, which in turn has an impact upon individuals' votes over redistri-
bution. This feedback mechanism between individual decisions and redistributive politics
could produce multiple equilibria (Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995; Saint-Paul and Verdier,
1997; Benabou, 2000). Based on the concept of a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium,
Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) capture the feedback
mechanism and demonstrate multiple equilibria that explain the cross-country variations
in welfare programs among democratic countries sharing similar economic backgrounds.
While the analysis by Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2007) provided a key insight into redistributive politics, it leaves the earning mobility
issue untouched. In their framework, agents who succeed in education during their youth
retain their skills over their life cycle without any additional eort, and thus face no risk of
downward mobility such as job loss or demotion. In addition, agents who fail in education
during their youth have no second opportunity of becoming skilled at a later stage of their
life and thus must accept their low-income status throughout their life. In an earlier study
(Arawatari and Ono, 2009), we considered a mutual link between upward mobility and
redistributive politics by introducing an upward mobility opportunity into the framework
of Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007).1 However, the downward mobility is omitted
from the analysis, and the eciency of mobility in the political equilibrium allocation in
the presence of earnings mobility is left untouched.
While previous studies contribute to our knowledge and understanding of mobility
and redistributive politics, the following issues still remain unresolved: (i) how do re-
distributive politics interact with mobility and distribution of income in the presence of
both upward mobility chance and downward mobility risk, and (ii) how does the political
equilibrium outcome depart from the commitment solution (called the Ramsey alloca-
tion) with respect to earnings mobility and redistribution? Answers to these questions
will provide more general insights into mobility and redistributive politics.
For the purpose of analysis, we adopt a framework based on that developed by Has-
sler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) and that extended by Arawatari and Ono (2009).
We further extend this framework by introducing downward mobility risk of agents. In
particular, we consider agents living in two periods, youth and old age. In youth, agents
1Early work by Piketty (1995) and Quadrini (1999) considered the eect of earnings mobility on
agents' preferences for redistribution. However, a mutual link between mobility and redistributive politics
is omitted from their analysis because of the assumption of exogenous mobility or idiosyncratic shocks
to mobility.
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undertake educational investments that determine whether their status in youth is skilled
(i.e., rich) or unskilled (i.e., poor). At the beginning of old age, unskilled agents have
an opportunity of upward mobility with a probability , and can increase the probabil-
ity of becoming skilled via reinvestment in education. By contrast, skilled agents are at
risk of downward mobility with a probability   , but they can reduce the probabil-
ity of becoming poor by reinvestment in education. The expectations of redistribution
aect the agents' decisions on education, which in turn determines voting behavior over
redistribution policy and thus mobility in the economy.
Focusing on the two key parameters,  and , we rst present the political equilibrium
allocation via majority voting and investigate how the two parameters aect the political
equilibrium outcome. When the upward mobility opportunity is high such that  is above
the threshold value, the economy attains a unique, unskilled-majority equilibrium with
no taxation on the old, representing the US. A high prospect of upward mobility in the
future gives agents a disincentive to invest in education in youth, but they support no
taxation on the old because of the prospect of upward mobility (POUM) in the future
(Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005).
In contrast, when  is below the threshold value, the economy attains multiple equi-
libria, representing some European countries. One equilibrium is an unskilled-majority
equilibrium with taxation on the old, representing those Continental European countries
which feature high inequality and low mobility; and the other is a skilled-majority equi-
librium with no taxation on the old, representing Scandinavian countries dened by low
inequality and high mobility. Which equilibrium is realized as an outcome depends on
the expectations of the agents.
The parameter , representing the risk of downward mobility, also aects agents' de-
cisions on education. In particular, a higher  gives agents a disincentive to invest in
education during youth because, for skilled agents, one's status in youth is less likely to
persist into old age. Given this feature, a natural prediction is that in an economy with
a high prospect of downward mobility the majority will be unskilled agents who support
taxation on the skilled old. The former prediction is true, but the latter is not. A higher 
implies a lower number of skilled old and thus less redistributive benet from taxation on
the skilled old. The redistributive benet is outweighed by the expected tax burden of the
unskilled who may become the skilled via reinvestment in education. Therefore, a higher
downward mobility risk is more likely to realize an equilibrium supporting the POUM
hypothesis. Upward mobility opportunity and downward mobility risk produce qualita-
tively similar properties with respect to political equilibrium characterization: this is the
result which was not shown in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) and Arawatari
and Ono (2009).
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Another noteworthy feature of the political equilibrium is that the relative number
of upwardly and downwardly mobile agents are completely dierent between the two
types of unskilled-majority equilibrium. The number of upwardly mobile agents is larger
than the number of downwardly mobile agents in the unskilled-majority equilibrium with
no taxation on the old, representing the US. However, the opposite result holds in the
unskilled-majority equilibrium with taxation on the old, representing some Continental
European countries. Whether the old are taxed or not critically aects the relative number
of upwardly and downwardly mobile agents. The model prediction would provide one
possible explanation for the dierence in earnings mobility between the US and some
Continental European countries.
We consider normative aspects of the political equilibrium with earnings mobility,
which was not fully investigated in the previous studies. We characterize a Ramsey
allocation dened as a feasible plan chosen by a benevolent planner who can commit
to a policy sequence. The planner is assumed to choose an allocation to maximize the
discounted sum of the utility functions of the successive generations.
By comparing the political equilibrium with the Ramsey allocation, we nd that the
skilled-majorty equilibrium, representing Scandinavian countries, attain mobility levels
close to the optimal ones. We also nd that the two types of unskilled-majority equilibrium
share similar implications of optimality with respect to downward mobility: they attain
lower numbers of downwardly mobile agents compared to those in the Ramsey allocation.
However, they show dierent implications of optimality with respect to upward mobility.
The unskilled-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old, representing the US,
shows a higher level of upward mobility whereas the unskilled-majority equilibrium with
100% taxation on the old, representing some Continental European countries, show a
lower level of upward mobility than that in the Ramsey allocation.
Besides the literature mentioned above, the current paper is also related to the lit-
erature on the dynamic political economy of redistribution in overlapping-generations
models with the concept of a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium. The literature in-
cludes studies demonstrating a unique equilibrium pinned down by the initial expectation
(Grossman and Helpman, 1998; Azariadis and Galasso, 2002) and multiple, self-fullling
expectations of agents (Hassler et al., 2003). These studies are extended by introducing
capital accumulation (Forni, 2005; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008, 2012; Song, 2009a),
retirement decisions of the elderly (Arawatari and Ono, 2011; Conde-Ruiz, Galasso and
Profeta, 2011), ideology shifts (Song, 2009b), risk-averse agents (Hassler et al., 2005),
wage inequality (Chen and Song, 2009), public debt accumulation (Song, Storesletten
and Zilibotti, 2012), intergenerational risk sharing (D'Amato and Galasso, 2010) and
intergenerational mobility (Arawatari and Ono, 2012). These studies assumed that the
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economic status of each agent persists into the future, thereby removing the eects of
earnings mobility over the life cycle. In contrast to these studies, the current paper in-
cludes earnings mobility over the life cycle, which plays a key role in redistributive politics
and its eciency.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3
characterizes the political equilibria and investigates their properties. Section 4 character-
izes the Ramsey allocation and considers normative aspects of the political equilibrium.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
The model is a two-period-lived overlapping-generations model based on that developed
by Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) and extended by Arawatari and Ono (2009).
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2;    : The economy consists of a continuum of
agents living for two periods, youth and old age.2 Each generation has a unit mass.
Consider the young agents born in period t. They are, at birth, identical. However,
they can aect their prospects in life with educational investment. In particular, they
become either skilled or unskilled, and by undertaking costly investment, can increase the
probability eyt of becoming skilled in youth. Skilled agents earn a high wage, normalized
to unity, whereas unskilled agents earn a low wage, normalized to zero. Because of this
assumption regarding wages, the probability eyt is set within a range [0; 1] without any
additional assumptions. The cost of investment during youth is given by (eyt )
2. This cost
is measured in terms of disutility; the nancial constraint of investment is omitted from
the analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of events and the distribution of the skilled
and the unskilled for generation t.
[Figure 1 about here.]
At the beginning of period t + 1, there are two types of old agents: skilled and un-
skilled. Our model diers from Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) and Arawatari
and Ono (2009) in that in old age, skilled agents may have a risk of downward mobility.
In particular, skilled agents can retain their status without any additional eort with
probability 1   2 [0; 1]; however, with probability  2 [0; 1], they need to reinvest in
education to keep their status in old age. The cost for skilled agents is given by (eost+1)
2;
2In the current framework, the rst and second periods of life corresponds to the young and the middle
life, respectively. For example, the rst-period of life includes ages of 25-44 years and the second-period
of life includes ages of 45-64 years. However, we follow the conventional terminology in a two-period
overlapping-generation model, and use the terms, youth and old age, throughout the paper.
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where eost+1 is the probability of being skilled and 1  eost+1 is the probability of being un-
skilled. Examples of educational investment in the later stage of life include part-time
study at a university, job-training programs and studying for a promotional examination.
With unskilled agents, they may have an opportunity for upward mobility as in
Arawatari and Ono (2009). They remain unskilled in old age with probability 1  2 [0; 1];
however, with probability  2 [0; 1], they have a second opportunity to reinvest in edu-
cation. The cost for unskilled agents is given by (eout+1)
2; where eout+1 is the probability of
being skilled and 1  eout+1 is the probability of being unskilled.
The parameter  2 [0; 1], solely capturing the eect of downward mobility risk, plays a
key role in our analysis. We introduce this parameter to distinguish between the upward
and downward mobility eects, and to focus on the role of downward mobility, which has
not yet been analyzed in previous studies. We should note that if  = 0; the current
model is similar to that of Arawatari and Ono (2009): unskilled agents may have an
opportunity for upward mobility, but skilled agents are faced with no downward risk. We
should also note that if  = 0; the current model is similar to that of Hassler, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2007). Our model includes the cases of Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti
(2007) and Arawatari and Ono (2009) as special ones.
There is no storage technology in this economy. Each agent uses his/her endowment
within a period. The government provides lump-sum transfers, s; nanced by taxes levied
on the rich. The tax rates are age dependent:  o for the old and  y for the young. The
tax rates are determined before the young agents decide on their investments.
Based on the description so far, we can summarize the expected utility functions of
agents alive at time t as follows:
V ost = (1  )(1   ot ) + feost (1   ot )  (eost )2g+ st; (1)
V out = feout  (1   ot )  (eout )2g+ st; (2)
V yt = e
y
t  (1   yt )  (eyt )2 + st (3)
+   eyt (1  )(1   ot+1) +   eost+1(1   ot+1)  (eost+1)2	
+ (1  eyt )

eout+1  (1   ot+1)  (eout+1)2
	
+ st+1

;
where V ost ; V
ou
t and V
y
t denote the utility of the skilled old, the utility of the unskilled
old and the utility of the young, respectively. The utility levels of V ost ; V
ou
t and V
y
t are
computed prior to individual success or failure. The parameter  2 (0; 1) is a discount
factor.
Given these preferences, a skilled old agent chooses eost to maximize V
os
t ; an unskilled
old agent chooses eout to maximize V
ou
t ; and a young agent in period t chooses e
y
t to
maximize V yt by taking account of the optimal investments in his/her old age, e
os
t+1 and
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eout+1. Therefore, optimal investments by the old and the young are given by, respectively:
eos( ot ) = e
ou( ot ) =
(1   ot )
2
; (4)
ey( yt ; 
o
t+1) =
1
2


(1   yt ) + 

(1  )(1   ot+1) 
(1  )
4
(1   ot+1)2

; (5)
where eoj 2 [0; 1=2], j = s; u and ey 2 [0; 1) hold for given  ot ;  yt and  ot+1.
Because young agents are ex ante identical, agents of the same cohort choose the same
investment. This implies that at the beginning of period t + 1, the proportion of the
unskilled old is equal to the probability of being failed in education in youth:
ut+1  1 ey( yt ;  ot+1) = 1 
1
2


(1   yt ) + 

(1  )(1   ot+1) 
(1  )
4
(1   ot+1)2

:
The proportion, ut+1, depends on the tax levied on the skilled young agents in period t,
 yt , and the tax levied on the skilled old agents in period t+ 1, 
o
t+1.
In this economy, there is earnings mobility over the life cycle. Let Mupt+1 denote the
number of upwardly mobile agents from period t to period t+1; i.e., the number of agents
who are unskilled in youth (in period t) but become skilled in old age (in period t + 1).
Let Mdownt+1 denote the number of downwardly mobile agents from period t to period t+1,
i.e., the number of agents who are skilled in youth (in period t) but become unskilled in
old age (in period t+ 1). Then, Mupt+1 and M
down
t+1 are calculated as, respectively:
Mupt+1 = (1  eyt )eout+1; Mdownt+1 = eyt (1  eost+1):
The tax revenues from the skilled agents are transferred to every agent in a lump-sum
fashion. The government budget is balanced in each period so that it can be expressed
as:
2st = W (
o
t ; ut) + Z(
y
t ; 
o
t+1);
where:
W ( ot ; ut)  [(1  ut)f(1  ) + eos( ot )g+ uteou( ot )]   ot ;
Z( yt ; 
o
t+1)  ey( yt ;  ot+1)   yt :
The left-hand side, denoted by 2st, represents aggregate transfers to the young and the
old. On the right-hand side, the rst term, denoted by W ( ot ; ut), is the tax revenue
nanced by the skilled old agents; and the second term, denoted by Z( yt ; 
o
t+1), is the tax
revenue nanced by the skilled young agents.
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3 Political Equilibria
This section characterizes political equilibria where agents vote on taxation period by
period. Section 3.1 provides the denition of a political equilibrium based on the con-
cept of a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with majority voting. Sections 3.2 and
3.3 provide the characterization of political equilibria classied according to the type of
majority. Section 3.4 demonstrates the mobility in the political equilibria.
3.1 Denition of Political Equilibrium
Following Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007), we assume
that agents vote over current taxes at the beginning of each period but that only the
old vote. Under this assumption, we exclusively focus on the political conict between
the rich and the poor within a generation; the conict between the young and the old is
abstracted away from the analysis.
With the optimal investments eos( ot ); e
ou( ot ) and e
y( yt ; 
o
t+1) and the government
budget constraint, the indirect utility functions of the skilled and the unskilled old are
given by, respectively:
V ost = (1  )(1   ot ) +

4
(1   ot )2 +
1
2
 W ( ot ; ut) + Z( yt ;  ot+1)	 ;
V out =

4
(1   ot )2 +
1
2
 W ( ot ; ut) + Z( yt ;  ot+1)	 :
The term in the rst line, (1 )(1  ot ), is the expected after-tax income of the skilled
old; the term (1   ot )2=4 in the rst line is the expected net benet from reinvestment
in education for the skilled old; the term (1  ot )2=4 in the second line is the expected net
benet from the second challenge for the unskilled old; and the term (W +Z)=2 observed
in both lines is the lump-sum transfer.
This paper focuses on stationary Markov-perfect equilibria with majority voting. The
proportion of unskilled old (ut) summarizes the state of the economy; the identity of a
decisive voter depends on this proportion. An oce-seeking politician elected by voters
sets policies to maximize the utility of the larger group. Given these features, we now
provide the denition of the political equilibrium as follows.
Denition: A (stationary Markov perfect) political equilibrium is dened as a triplet
of functions fT o; T y; Ug; where T o : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] and T y are two public policy
rules,  ot = T
o(ut) and 
y
t = T
y; and U : [0; 1] ! [0; 1] is a private decision rule,
ut+1 = U(
y
t ); such that given u0, the following functional equations hold.
1. T o(ut) =

argmaxot 2[0;1] V
os
t if ut  1=2;
argmaxot 2[0;1] V
ou
t if ut > 1=2;
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2. U( yt ) = 1  ey( yt ;  ot+1); with  ot+1 = T o(U( yt ));
3. T y = argmaxot 2[0;1] Z(
y
t ; 
o
t+1) subject to 
o
t+1 = T
o(U( yt )):
The rst equilibrium condition requires that the decisive voter chooses  ot to maximize
the utility of the skilled old (if ut < 1=2) or the unskilled old (if ut > 1=2). In the case of
an equal number of skilled and unskilled agents (i.e., ut = 1=2), the skilled old are assumed
to be decisive. The second equilibrium condition implies that all young individuals choose
their investment optimally, given  yt and 
o
t+1; under rational expectations about future
taxes and distributions of types. The third equilibrium condition requires that the decisive
voter chooses  yt to maximize revenue from the young. Rational voters understand that
their choice over current redistribution aects future redistribution via the private decision
rule and public policy.
3.2 The Determination of T o and U
We now solve the equilibrium conditions recursively. Condition 1 denes a one-to-
one mapping from the state variable to the equilibrium choice of taxation of the old:
 ot = T
o(ut). Suppose that the skilled old form the majority: ut  1=2. The objective
function of the majority is given by V ost . This function has the following properties:
@V ost (
o
t ; ut)=@
o
t jot =0  0 and @2V ost ( ot ; ut)=@ o2t < 0.3 These properties imply that V ot s
is maximized at  ot = 0: the skilled old pay more than they receive because unskilled
agents pay no tax even though the revenue is distributed equally between skilled and
unskilled agents. Therefore, the skilled old prefer  ot = 0, implying that T
o(ut) = 0 if the
majority are skilled agents:
T o(ut) = 0 if ut 2

0;
1
2

. (6)
Alternatively, suppose that the unskilled old are in the majority: ut > 1=2. The
objective function of the majority is given by V out (
o
t ; ut). The second derivative of this
function with respect to  ot is:
@2V out (
o
t ; ut)
@ o2t
=

2
(1  )(1  ut) > 0;
3The rst and the second derivatives of V ost (
o
t ; ut) with respect to 
o
t are given by, respectively:
@V ost (
o
t ; ut)=@
o
t = ( 1)(1  )  (=2)  (1  ot )
+ (1=2) [(1  )(1  ut) + (=2)  (1  2ot )f1  (1  )(1  ut)g] ;
@2V ost (
o
t ; ut)=@
o2
t =  (=2)  (1  )ut < 0:
We evaluate the rst derivative at ot = 0 and obtain:
@V ost (
o
t ; ut)=@
o
t jot =0 =  (1=2) [1  (=2)]  (1=2) [1  (=2)(1 + )]ut  0;
where the inequality holds under the assumption of  2 [0; 1] and  2 [0; 1].
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implying that the unskilled old prefer  ot = 0 or 1 depending on the relative size of V
ou
t jot =0
and V out jot =1. Given that V out jot =0 ? V out jot =1 , ut ? 1  = f2(1  )g, the tax on the
old when the majority are unskilled is given by:
T o(ut)
8><>:
= 0 if ut > 1  2(1 )
2 f0; 1g if ut = 1  2(1 )
= 1 if ut < 1  2(1 )
(7)
Condition (7) means that if the number of unskilled agents is larger/smaller than the
threshold level, 1   = f2(1  )g, then the expected marginal benet from taxation is
smaller/larger than the expected marginal cost of taxation. The unskilled agents know
that the size of the tax base, 1   ut, is smaller/larger such that they can get less/more
than they pay. Therefore, they prefer  ot = 0(= 1) if ut > (<)1   = f2(1  )g. If
ut = 1   = f2(1  )g, then the expected marginal benet is equal to the expected
marginal cost; they are indierent as to whether there is 100% taxation or no taxation.
Given (6) and (7), we can summarize the mapping satisfying equilibrium condition 1
as follows.
(a) The case of (1 + )  1 (i.e., 1=2  1  = f2(1  )g):
T o(ut) = 0 8 ut 2 [0; 1]: (8)
(b) The case of (1 + ) < 1 (i.e., 1=2 < 1  = f2(1  )g):
T o(ut)
8><>:
= 0 if ut  12 or 1  2(1 ) < ut  1
2 f0; 1g if ut = 1  2(1 )
= 1 if 1
2
< ut < 1  2(1 )
(9)
Case (a) is trivial because there is no taxation on the old regardless of the status of a
decisive voter. In what follows, we exclusively focus on case (b) by making the following
assumption:
Assumption 1: (1 + ) < 1:
Next, we rewrite equilibrium condition 2 by substituting in the optimal investment
ey( yt ; 
o
t+1). This yields the following functional equation:
U( yt ) = 1 
1
2


(1   yt ) + 

(1  )(1  T o (U( yt ))) 
(1  )
4
(1  T o (U( yt )))2

;
(10)
where T o() is given by (9) under Assumption 1. We derive the solution to the functional
equation (10) by assuming rational expectations. Any solution to the functional equation
(10) is given by:
U( yt ) =
(
1  1
2

h
(1   yt ) + 
n
(1  )  (1 )
4
oi
if  yt   s0 or u0   yt
1  1
2
 (1   yt ) if  yt  u1
(11)
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where:
 s0  

(1  )  (1  )
4

;
u0  1  (1 + )
1   + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

;
u1  1  (1 + )
1   :
The interpretation of (11) is as follows. Suppose that agents in period t expect  ot+1 = 0.
Under this expectation, young agents choose their investment as ey( yt ; 0). By (9), this
expectation is rational if ut+1 = 1   ey( yt ; 0)  1=2 or 1   = f2(1  )g  ut+1 =
1   ey( yt ; 0)  1, that is, if  yt   s0 or u0   yt . The former condition implies that a
low tax burden on the young does not dampen their motivation of educational investment,
thereby resulting in a skilled majority who support no taxation on the old. The latter
condition implies that a high tax burden on the young gives them a disincentive for
educational investment, which results in an unskilled majority. While their income status
is low, the unskilled support no taxation on the old because of the hope of upward mobility
in their old age.
Next, suppose that the young agents in period t expect  ot+1 = 1. Under this expec-
tation, young agents choose their investment as ey( yt ; 1). By (9), their expectation is
rational if 1=2 < ut+1 = 1   ey( yt ; 1)  1   = f2(1  )g ; that is, if  yt  u1. The
condition implies that the tax burden is low for the young. However, the low tax burden
does not stimulate an incentive in unskilled agents towards educational investment due
to the expectation of high tax burden in their old age. Therefore, the majority become
the unskilled who support 100% taxation on the skilled old.
As illustrated in Figure 2, there are multiple, self-fullling expectations of U for the
set of  yt  min f s0; u1g. Which U arises in equilibrium depends on the expectations
of agents. To illustrate U in equilibrium, we follow the method of Hassler, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2007) and introduce the critical rate of  yt : 
e  min f s0; u1g. The rate
 e, which depends on the expectations of agents, is the highest tax rate that can yield
an unskilled old majority. For  yt > 
e, the majority are the unskilled old. However, for
 yt   e; the majority are either skilled or unskilled depending on agents' expectations.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 illustrates the case where the tax rate  e is the highest rate that
produces the skilled majority; panel (b) illustrates the case where  s0 is the highest tax
rate that produces the skilled majority.
[Figure 2 about here.]
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Given the denition of  e, the solution is given by:
U( yt ) =
8<:
fU0( yt ); U1( yt )g if  yt   e
U1( yt ) if 
e <  yt  u1
U0( yt ) if 
u1 <  yt   s0; or u0   yt  1
(12)
where U0( yt ) and U
1( yt ) are dened by:
U0( yt )  1 
1
2


(1   yt ) + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

;
U1( yt )  1 
1
2
(1   yt ):
The superscripts \0" and \1" imply 0% and 100% taxation on the old, respectively.
3.3 The Determination of T y and the Characterization of the
Political Equilibria
Given the characterization of T o and U satisfying equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, respec-
tively, we now consider the tax rate on the young,  yt , that satises equilibrium condition
3. Because there are two possible cases of majority, we introduce corresponding deni-
tions of the political equilibria: an unskilled-majority equilibrium and a skilled-majority
equilibrium.
The rst equilibrium condition given by (9) implies that when the majority are un-
skilled, there are two types of unskilled-majority equilibria: one is the equilibrium where
agents expect no taxation on the old ( ot+1 = 0) and choose 
y
t to induce an unskilled
majority at time t + 1 (ut+1 > 1=2); the other is the equilibrium where agents expect
taxation on the old ( ot+1 = 1) and choose 
y
t to induce an unskilled majority at time
t+ 1 (ut+1 > 1=2). In contrast, when the majority are skilled, there is a skilled-majority
equilibrium where agents expect no taxation on the old ( ot+1 = 0) and choose 
y
t to induce
a skilled majority at time t+ 1 (ut+1  1=2).
Before proceeding to the analysis, we note the following properties of the tax revenue
function Z(; ) in order to nd  yt that satises equilibrium condition 3: (i) Z( yt ; 0) >
Z( yt ; 1) for any 
y
t 2 [0; 1]; and (ii) Z( yt ; 0) and Z( yt ; 1) attain the tops of the Laer
curves at
 yt =
1
2
 [1 +  f(1  )  (1  )=4g] and  yt =
1
2
;
respectively. Given these properties with equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, revenue from
the young can be illustrated as in Figure 3.
Panel (a) in Figure 3 illustrates a case that produces the unskilled-majority equilibrium
with no taxation on the old: that is, the tax revenue from the young is maximized under
the expectation of  ot+1 = 0. There are two possible cases: an interior solution where the
revenue from the young is maximized by setting the tax rate,  yt = argmaxZ(
y
t ; 0), that
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attains the top of the Laer curve; and a corner solution case where the revenue from the
young might be maximized at  yt = 
u0. Panel (a) illustrates the latter case.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Panel (b) in Figure 3 also illustrates a case that produces the unskilled-majority equi-
librium. However, this case diers from that illustrated in Panel (a) in that it is rational
to expect taxation on the old. That is, the revenue from the young is represented by
Z( y; 1). Panel (b) illustrates an interior solution where the revenue from the young
is maximized by setting the tax rate that attains the top of the Laer curve Z( y; 1):
 yt = argmaxZ(
y
t ; 1) = 1=2.
Finally, Panel (c) in Figure 3 illustrates the case that produces the skilled-majority
equilibrium. As shown in the previous section, the skilled agents might form the majority
when the tax rate on the young is below the critical rate  e. Panel (c) illustrates the
case where the revenue from the young is maximized at  =  e. However, when  e is set
to be low, the unskilled-majority equilibrium is realized as demonstrated in Panel (b).
Therefore, there are multiple equilibria depending on the expectations of agents.
Based on the abovementioned argument, we can derive the condition for the existence
of each type of equilibrium. However, a complete characterization of the political equi-
libria requires a lot of space for presentation. In order to save space and to simplify the
presentation, we demonstrate the numerical results for the equilibria, leaving a full char-
acterization of the equilibria in Appendix B. Figure 4 illustrates the political equilibria
where  is xed at 0:8 and  and  vary between the ranges of (0; 0:5555) and (0; 1),
respectively.4 Figure 5 illustrates the political equilibria where  is xed at 0:4 and both
 and  vary between the range of (0; 1).
[Figures 4 and 5 about here.]
First, let us consider the eect of the parameter  by utilizing Figure 4. For example,
let  = 0:5438.5 There is a threshold value of , ^ = 0:3043, such that the equilibrium
is characterized by the unskilled majority who support no taxation on the old when 
is above the threshold value. A higher  implies that agents have excellent prospects of
upward mobility in old age; this prospect gives agents a disincentive to invest in education
in youth. Therefore, a high  leads to a majority of unskilled agents who prefer no taxation
4The upper bound of  in Figure 4 is given by 0:5555 under Assumption 1:  < 1=(1+) = 1=(1+0:8) 
0:5555:
5The selection of  is as follows. We assume a generation to be 20 years in length. The rst and
the second period correspond to, for example, ages 25-44 and 45-64 years, respectively. Our selection of
one-period discount factor is 0.97. Because the agents under the current assumption plan over generations
that span 20 years, we discount the future by (0:97)20  0:5438:
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on the old. The POUM hypothesis, supported by the US data (Benabou and Ok, 2001;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) holds when  is above the threshold value.
When  is below the threshold value, there is no equilibrium that supports the POUM
hypothesis. This is because given few chances for second opportunities, the status in
youth is highly persistent in old age. The unskilled and skilled agents are expected to
remain unskilled and skilled in old age with a high probability; therefore, the unskilled
agents prefer taxation on the skilled old whereas the skilled prefer no taxation on the
skilled old. The majority become unskilled when agents attach a low value to old-age
utility, whereas they become skilled when they attach a high value to old-age utility. The
equilibrium outcome depends on the expectations of agents.
Next, consider the eect of  by utilizing Figure 5 where  is xed at 0:4. By xing
the value of , we can focus exclusively on the eect of downward mobility risk, and we
are insulated from the prospect of upward mobility captured by the parameter . As
demonstrated in Figure 5, given  = 0:5438; the economy is more likely to be in the
unskilled-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old when the risk of downward
mobility is higher. Therefore, a higher probability of downward mobility also produces
the equilibrium that supports the POUM hypothesis. Although the parameters  and
 have dierent implications for mobility, they lead to similar results with regard to the
emergence of the equilibrium supporting the POUM hypothesis.
3.4 Mobility in the Political Equilibria
By using the numerical result demonstrated in Section 3.3, we compute the numbers of
upwardly and downwardly mobile agents. The solid curves and shaded areas in Figures
6 and 7 depict how the numbers of upwardly and downwardly mobile agents are aected
by the parameters  and , respectively.6 We should note that the numbers of mobile
agents in the skilled-majority equilibria are illustrated by the shaded area in Figures 6
and 7 because the size of redistribution depends on the agents' expectations which take
continuum values.
[Figures 6 and 7 about here.]
From the gures, we can make the following observation which holds in general for
each type of equilibria (for formal proof, see Appendix B). First, consider the unskilled-
majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old. The number of mobile agents are
plotted by the solid curve for the range of  2 [0:3043; 1) in Figure 6 and by that for the
range of  2 [0:2613; 1) in Figure 7. In this equilibrium, the number of upwardly mobile
agents is larger than the number of downwardly mobile agents.
6Dotted curves in the gures depict the corresponding values in the Ramsey allocation investigated
in the next section.
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The mechanism behind the abovementioned result is as follows. First, u is the number
of unskilled who have an opportunity of becoming skilled in old age. This is larger than
the number of skilled who have a possibility of becoming unskilled in old age, (1  u),
because u > 1=2 holds in an unskilled-majority equilibrium. Second, for the unskilled who
have opportunities of upward mobility, the probability of becoming skilled is equal to the
probability of becoming unskilled for the skilled who face the risk of downward mobility:
1  eos = eou = 1=2. Therefore, the number of upwardly mobile agents is given by u=2,
which is greater than the number of downwardly mobile agents given by (1  u)=2.
Next, consider the unskilled-majority equilibrium with taxation on the old. The mo-
bility in this equilibrium is depicted for the range of  2 (0; 0:3043) in Figure 6 and for
the range of  2 (0; 0:2613) in Figure 7. In this equilibrium, there is no upwardly mobile
agent; however, there are some downwardly mobile agents as illustrated by the inferior of
the shaded area in Panel (a). This result is qualitatively opposite to that in the unskilled-
majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old. The dierence in mobility between the
two types of unskilled-majorty equilibrium comes from whether the old are taxed or not.
Finally, consider the skilled-majority equilibrium where the number of mobile agents
are illustrated by the shaded area in Figures 6 and 7. In this equilibrium, there is no
taxation on the old. This implies that the probability of becoming skilled for the unskilled
who have opportunity for upward mobility is equal to the probability of becoming unskilled
for the skilled who face the risk of downward mobility: eou = 1   eos = 1=2: Thus, the
relative number of upwardly and downwardly mobile agents depends on the number of
unskilled with a mobility opportunity, (1  ey), and the number of skilled with mobility
risk, ey; that is, it depends on the expectations of agents represented by the parameter
 e.
4 Ramsey Allocation
In this section, we characterize a Ramsey allocation as a feasible plan chosen by a benev-
olent social planner who can commit to a policy sequence at time zero (Subsection 4.1).
The Ramsey allocation derived here will be compared with the political equilibria in order
to consider the normative aspect of the politics (Subsection 4.2).
4.1 Characterization of the Ramsey Allocation
The Ramsey allocation solves the following problem:
max  f(1  u0)V os(s0;  o0 ) + u0V ou(s0;  o0 )g+
1X
t=0
t+1V yt (et; st; st+1; 
y
t ; 
o
t+1);
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where  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor and u0 2 [0; 1] is the initial distribution. The term
(1   u0)V os is the utility of the initial skilled old V os multiplied by their proportion
1   u0, the term u0V ou is the utility of the initial unskilled old V ou multiplied by their
proportion u0 and the term
P1
t=0 
t+1V yt is the discounted sum of the utility functions of
the successive young generations.
Given the educational investments (4) and (5) and the government budget constraint,
the problem can be rewritten as a simple static problem (see Appendix A for the derivation
of the following expression):
max
o02[0;1]
L0 +
L
1  ; (13)
where:
L0  (1  o0 )
h
(1  u0)(1  ) + 
4
(1   o0 ) f(1  u0) + u0g
i
+
1
2
(+)W ( o0 ; u0) (14)
and:
L  1
2
(+) [Z( y;  o) + W ( o; 1  ey( y;  o))]+

(ey( y;  o))2 +

4
(1   o)2

: (15)
The problem implies that after the initial choice of  o0 , the problem reduces to a sequence of
identical static optimization problems over  y and  o. The next proposition characterizes
the solution of the Ramsey problem.
Proposition 1: The allocation solving the Ramsey problem has:
 o0 =
(
0 if   
min
n
1;  


(1 u0)(1 )
(1 u0)+u0 +

2
o
if  > 
and a constant sequence of taxes,  y and  o, given by:
( y;  o) =
8><>:

 
2
h
1 + 

(1  )  (1 )
4
i
; 0

if  < 
(0; 0) if  = 
(0;min f1; ^ og) if  > 
where ^ o is a  o that satises:
 o =
(  ) [f(1  )  (=2)(1  )(1   o)g ey(0;  o) + (=2)(1   o)]
(1=2)( + )

   (1  )ey(0;  o) +  f(1  )  (=2)(1  )(1   o)g2 :
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 states that the tax rates in the Ramsey allocation depend on the relative
magnitude between  and . For  > , the planner attaches a larger weight to the young
and a smaller weight to the old: the tax burden falls on the old. For  = , the planner
attaches the same weights to the young and the old, but nds it optimal to set no tax on
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both of them. For  < , the planner attaches a larger weight to the old and a smaller
weight to the young: the tax burden falls on the young.
Given the result in Proposition 1, we can calculate mobility in the Ramsey allocation.
In particular, Mup and Mdown in period t  1 are given by:
Mup = (1  ey)eou
=

1  1
2
h
(1   y) + 
n
(1  )(1   o)  
4
(1  )(1   o)2
oi 
2
(1   o);
Mdown = ey(1  eos)
=
1
2
h
(1   y) + 
n
(1  )(1   o)  
4
(1  )(1   o)2
oi


1  1
2
(1   o)

:
Dotted curves in Figures 6 and 7 depict how Mup and Mdown in the Ramsey allocation
are aected by the parameters  and , respectively.
4.2 Normative Aspect of Political Equilibria
Let us now discuss the normative aspect of the political equilibria in terms of mobil-
ity and redistribution, based on the observation in Figures 6 and 7. First, consider the
unskilled-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old, where the POUM hypothesis
is supported. From the viewpoint of redistribution, this equilibrium bears some resem-
blance to the Ramsey allocation in the case of  < , where the tax burden falls on the
young. However, there is a remarkable dierence in mobility between the political equi-
librium and the Ramsey allocation: the Ramsey allocation requires a larger number of
downwardly mobile agents and a smaller number of upwardly mobile agents compared to
those in the corresponding political equilibrium. In other words, the political equilibrium
realizes excessively high upward mobility and low downward mobility from the viewpoint
of optimality.
The abovementioned result comes from the fact that the tax burden on the young is
lower in the Ramsey allocation than in the political equilibria. A lower tax burden in the
Ramsey allocation results in a larger number of agents being skilled in youth. This implies
a larger number of potential agents who experience downward mobility in old age; and it
also implies a smaller number of potential agents who can get chances for upward mobility
in old age. Given these factors, the Rasemy allocation requires higher downward mobility
and lower upward mobility compared to those in the corresponding political equilibrium.
Next, consider the unskilled-majority equilibrium with taxation on the old. >From the
viewpoint of redistribution, the equilibrium has a resemblance to the Ramsey allocation
in the case of  > , where the tax burden falls on the old. However, there is a dierence
in that the Ramsey planner does not impose the tax on the young, while they are taxed
in the political equilibrium.
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There is also a dierence in mobility. The downward mobility is lower in the political
equilibrium than in the Ramsey allocation. In addition, there are some agents who can
move up the income ladder in the Rasemy allocation, while there are no such agents
in the political economy because of 100% taxation on the old. Therefore, the unskilled-
majority equilibrium with 100% taxation on the old attains excessively low downward and
upward mobility from the viewpoint of optimality. In summary, the two types of unskilled-
majority equilibrium analyzed so far share similar implications of optimality with respect
to downward mobility, but have dierent implications with respect to upward mobility.
Finally, consider the skilled-majority equilibrium. This equilibrium bears some resem-
blance to the Ramsey tax in terms of redistribution in the case of  < , where the tax
burden falls on the young. However, this resemblance is not rm because under the set of
parameters that attain the skilled-majority equilibrium, there may also be the unskilled-
majority equilibrium. In the situation of multiple equilibria, the political economy may or
may not attain an allocation similar to the Ramsey allocation depending on expectations
of agents and the planner's weight to the young. In addition, the quantitative property
of mobility in the political equilibrium may or may not be similar to that in the Ramsey
allocation depending on the expectations of agents.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple theoretical model that includes life cycle earnings mobility
and redistributive politics. The model demonstrates a mutual link between mobility and
redistributive politics, and gives a comparison between the political equilibrium and the
Ramsey allocation in terms of mobility and redistributive policy.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, the model draws a distinction between
upward mobility opportunity and downward mobility risk, but it shows that two factors
play similar roles in the characterization of political equilibrium. When the opportunity
and risk are high, the economy is more likely to attain a unique, unskilled-majority equi-
librium representing the US, where the POUM hypothesis is supported. However, when
the opportunity and risk are low, the economy attains multiple equilibria: an unskilled-
majority equilibrium that features low earnings mobility, representing some Continental
European countries, and a skilled-majority equilibrium that features high earnings mo-
bility, representing Scandinavian countries. Which equilibrium is realized as an outcome
depends on the expectations of the agents.
Second, we characterize the Ramsey allocation that denes an optimal allocation, and
compare the political equilibrium with the Ramsey allocation to evaluate the optimality
of the political equilibrium in terms of earnings mobility. We nd that the skilled-majority
equilibrium, representing Scandinavian countries, attains close-to-optimal mobility levels.
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We also nd that two types of unskilled-majority equilibrium attain lower downward
mobility from the viewpoint of optimality, but show dierent implications of optimality
with respect to upward mobility. In particular, the equilibrium representing the US shows
higher upward mobility while the equilibrium representing some Continental European
countries shows lower upward mobility compared to the optimal one.
To obtain these results, we simplied the analysis by adopting a simple lump-sum
transfer scheme. We did not consider alternative policy methods, for example, transfers
that target the elderly or the poor. In addition, we did not consider dierences in abil-
ity by assuming homogeneous agents. However, we believe that this paper provides a
tractable framework for explaining the cross-country dierences in earnings mobility and
redistribution policy and for examining the eciency implications of mobility opportunity
and risk.
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6 Appendix A
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst show that the Ramsey problem is written as a static optimization problem given
by (13){(15). To show this, we calculate the indirect utility functions of the initial old
and the young in generation t :
V os0 = (1  )(1   o0 ) +

4
(1   o0 )2 +
1
2
fW ( o0 ; u0) + Z( y0 ;  o1 )g;
V ou0 =

4
(1   o0 )2 +
1
2
fW ( o0 ; u0) + Z( y0 ;  o1 )g;
V yt = e
y( yt ; 
o
t+1)  (1   yt )  (ey( yt ;  ot+1))2 +
1
2
fW ( ot ; ut) + Z( yt ;  ot+1)g
+ 

ey( yt ; 
o
t+1)

(1  )(1   ot+1) +

4
(1   ot+1)2

+
 
1  ey( yt ;  ot+1)
 
4
(1   ot+1)2 +
1
2
fW ( ot+1; ut+1) + Z( yt+1;  ot+2)g

:
We substitute these functions into the social welfare function, denoted by 
, to obtain:

 = (1  u0) 
2664(1  )(1   o0 ) + 4 (1   o0 )2| {z }
(a.1)
+
1
2
W ( o0 ; u0)| {z }
(a.2)
+
1
2
Z( y0 ; 
o
1 )| {z }
(b.1)
3775
+ u0 
26644 (1   o0 )2| {z }
(a.3)
+
1
2
W ( o0 ; u0)| {z }
(a.4)
+
1
2
Z( y0 ; 
o
1 )| {z }
(b.2)
3775
+  
2664ey( y0 ;  o1 )  (1   y0 )  (ey( y0 ;  o1 ))2| {z }
(b.3)
+
1
2
W ( o0 ; u0)| {z }
(a.5)
+
1
2
Z( y0 ; 
o
1 )| {z }
(b.4)
+ 
8>>><>>>:e
y( y0 ; 
o
1 )

(1  )(1   o1 ) +

4
(1   o1 )2

+ (1  ey( y0 ;  o1 ))

4
(1   o1 )2| {z }
(b.5)
+
1
2
W ( o1 ; u1)| {z }
(b.6)
+
1
2
Z( y1 ; 
o
2 )| {z }
(c.1)
9>>=>>;
3775
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+ 2 
2664ey( y1 ;  o2 )  (1   y1 )  (ey( y1 ;  o2 ))2| {z }
(c.2)
+
1
2
W ( o1 ; u1)| {z }
(b.7)
+
1
2
Z( y1 ; 
o
2 )| {z }
(c.3)
+ 
8>>><>>>:e
y( y1 ; 
o
2 )

(1  )(1   o2 ) +

4
(1   o2 )2

+ (1  ey( y1 ;  o2 ))

4
(1   o2 )2| {z }
(c.4)
+
1
2
W ( o2 ; u2)| {z }
(c.5)
+
1
2
Z( y2 ; 
o
3 )
9>>=>>;
3775
+ 3 
2664ey( y2 ;  o3 )  (1   y2 )  (ey( y2 ;  o3 ))2 + 12W ( o2 ; u2)| {z }
(c.6)
+
1
2
Z( y2 ; 
o
3 )
+ 

ey( y2 ; 
o
3 )

(1  )(1   o3 ) +

4
(1   o3 )2

+ (1  ey( y2 ;  o3 ))

4
(1   o3 )2
+
1
2
W ( o3 ; u3) +
1
2
Z( y3 ; 
o
4 )

+
1X
t=3
t+1V yt
where the terms (a1){(a5) include  o0 , the terms (b.1){(b.7) include 
y
0 and/or 
o
1 , the
terms (c.1){(c.6) include  y1 and/or 
o
2 , and so on. Given this feature, the equation above
is rewritten as:

 = L0 +
1X
t=1
tLt;
where:
L0  (1   o0 )
h
(1  u0)(1  ) + 
4
(1   o0 )f(1  u0) + u0g
i
+
1
2
( + )W ( o0 ; u0);
Lt  1
2
( + )

Z( yt 1; 
o
t ) + W (
o
t ; 1  ey( yt 1;  ot ))

+ 
 
ey( yt 1; 
o
t )
2
+

4
(1   ot )2

:
The function L0 is the sum of the terms (a1){(a5), the function L1 is the sum of the terms
(b1){(b7), the function L2 is the sum of the terms (c1){(c6), and so on. The function Lt
(t  1) indicates that the solution of ( yt 1;  ot ) that maximizes Lt is stationary over time.
Therefore, we can write the Ramsey problem as (13){(15).
Part 1 of Proposition 1
The solution of  o0 is derived by solving (14). The rst derivative of L0 with respect
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to  o0 is:
@L0
@ o0
= ( )
h
(1  u0)(1  ) + 
4
(1   o0 ) f(1  u0) + u0g
i
+ ( )(1   o0 )

4
f(1  u0) + u0g
+
1
2
( + )
h
(1  u0)(1  ) + 
2
(1   o0 ) f1  (1  )(1  u0)g
i
+ ( 1)1
2
( + )  
2
 f1  (1  )(1  u0)g  o0 :
Therefore, the solution is given by:78><>:
 o0 = 0 if @L0=@
o
0 jo0=0  0
 o0 = 1 if @L0=@
o
0 jo0=1  0
 o0 =
 

h
(1 u0)(1 )
(1 u0)+u0 +

2
i
otherwise.
The condition @L0=@
o
0 jo0=0  0 is rewritten as   . The condition @L0=@ o0 jo0=1 
0 is reduced to (1   )(1   u0)(   )  (=2)( + ) f(1  u0) + u0g. Therefore, we
obtain:8><>:
 o0 = 0 if   
 o0 = 1 if  >  and u0  (1 )( ) (=2)(+)(1 )( )+(1 )(=2)(+)
 o0 =
 

h
(1 u0)(1 )
(1 u0)+u0 +

2
i
if otherwise.
The last two solutions are summarized as:
 o0 = min

1;
  


(1  u0)(1  )
(1  u0) + u0 +

2

if  > :
Part 2 of Proposition 1
Next, we derive the solution of the pair ( y;  o) by solving (15). The solution must
satisfy the following rst-order conditions:
 y : @L=@ y   y1 + y0 = 0; (16)
 o : @L=@ o   o1 + o0 = 0; (17)
where y0 and 
o
0 are Kuhn{Tucker multipliers associated with the constraints 
y  0 and
 o  0, respectively, whereas y1 and o1 are the Kuhn{Tucker multipliers associated with
the constraints  y  1 and  o  1, respectively.
7The second-order condition, @2L0=@
o2
0 < 0, is satised:
@2L0
@o20
=

2
f(1  u0) + u0g   1
2
( + )  f1  (1  )(1  u0)g
 
2
f(1  u0) + u0g   
2
f1  (1  )(1  u0)g
= 0:
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The rst-order conditions with respect to  y and  o are given by, respectively:
 y :
1
2
( + )ey( y;  o)  1
4
( + ) y +
1
4
( + )
n
( 1)(1  ) + 
2
(1  )(1   o)
o
 o
= y1   y0 ; (18)
 o :
1
2
( + )

1
2

n
( 1)(1  ) + 
2
(1   o)(1  )
o
 y
+
n
(1  )  
2
(1  )(1  2 o)
o
ey( y;  o)
+

2
(1  2 o)  
2
n
(1  )  
2
(1  )(1   o)
o2
 o

+ 

ey( y;  o)
n
( 1)(1  ) + 
2
(1   o)(1  )
o
  
2
(1   o)

= o1   o0: (19)
First, assume that  o = y1 = 
o
1 = 
y
0 = 0: Then, from (18) and (19), we obtain:
 y =
1
2
(   )
n
1 + ((1  )  
4
(1  ))
o
2 (0; 1);
o0 = (   )
n
(1  )  
2
(1  )
o
ey( y;  o)
1
2
( + ) +

4

;
where o0 > 0 as long as  > . If  = , then (
y;  o) = (0; 0).
Next, assume that  y = y1 = 
o
1 = 
o
0 = 0: Then, from (18) and (19), we obtain:
 o =
(  ) (1  )  
2
(1  )(1   o)	 ey(0;  o) + 
2
(1   o)
1
2
( + )
h
   (1  )ey(0;  o) +  (1  )  
2
(1  )(1   o)	2i ; (20)
y0 =
1
4
(  )
h
1 + 
n
(1  )(1   o)  
4
(1  )(1   o)2
oi
+
1
4
( + )
n
(1  )  
2
(1  )(1   o)
o
 o;
where  o > 0 and y0 > 0 as long as  > .
The left-hand and right-hand sides of (20), denoted by LHS and RHS, respectively,
have the following properties:
@LHS
@ o
> 0; LHSjo=0 = 0; LHSjo=1 = 1;
@RHS
@ o
< 0; RHSjo=0 > 0; RHSjo=1 =
(  )(1  )
( + ) [ f1  (1=2)(1  )g+ (1  )2] :
Given these properties, there exists a  o; denoted by ^ o, that satises (20), where ^ o
is dened in Proposition 1. If LHSjo=1 > RHSjo=1, then  o = ^ o; otherwise,  o = 1:
 o = min(^ o; 1):
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It remains to be checked whether  y = 0 continues to be a solution. Given  o =
min(^ o; 1); we obtain:
y0 =   @L=@ yjy=0
=
1
4
(  )
h
1 + 
n
(1  )(1   o)  
4
(1  )(1   o)2
oi
+
1
4
( + )
n
(1  )  
2
(1  )(1   o)
o
 o
> 0;
where the last inequality holds under the assumption of  > . Therefore, we obtain
( y;  o) = (0;min(^ o; 1)) if  > : 
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7 Appendix B (Not for Publication)
In this appendix, we provide a formal characterization of the political equilibria demon-
strated in Section 3. For notational convenience, we dene:
  1
(1  )  
4
(1  ) ;
argmaxZ( yt ; 0) = 
Z0
max 
1
2
 [1 +  f(1  )  (1  )=4g] :
7.1 Unskilled-majority Equilibrium with No Taxation on the
Old
We rst characterize an unskilled-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old.
Proposition B1:
(i) Suppose that the following condition holds:
   

1  2  1    (1 + )
1  

:
There exists a set of unskilled-majority equilibria with no taxation on the old such
that 8t; T o is given by (9), U( yt ) is given by (12) and T y = Z0max. The equi-
librium outcome is unique, such that 8t,  yt = Z0max,  ot = 0, ut = 1   (1=4) 
[1 +  f(1  )  (=4)(1  )g] and Mup > Mdown:
(ii) Suppose that the following conditions hold:
(a)  

1  2  1    (1 + )
1  

< ; (b)     
1   ; and
(c)  

1  
4
  1  (1 + )
1  

 :
There exists a set of unskilled-majority equilibria with no taxation on the old such
that 8t; T o is given by (9), U( yt ) is given by (12) and T y = u0. The equilibrium
outcome is unique, such that 8t,  yt = u0,  ot = 0, ut = 1   =2(1   ) and
Mup > Mdown:
Proof.
(i) Suppose that at time t; agents know that  yt = argmaxZ(
y
t ; 0)  Z0max and expect
 ot+1 = 0. Then:
ut+1 = 1  ey
 
Z0max; 0

= 1  1
4

1 + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

> 1=2;
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where the last inequality comes from  2 (0; 1] and ;  2 [0; 1]. By (9), this implies
that  ot+1 = 0, fullling initial expectations. Therefore, there exists an unskilled-majority
equilibrium with no taxation on the old if the decisive voter nds it optimal to set  yt =
Z0max.
To establish that setting  yt = 
Z0
max is optimal for the decisive voter, we note the
following properties of the function Z : (a) Z( yt ; 0) is concave in 
y
t and is maximized
at  yt = argmaxyt 2[0;1] Z(
y
t ; 0) = 
Z0
max; and (b) Z(
y
t ; 0) > Z(
y
t ; 1)8 yt 2 (0; 1]. These
properties imply that setting  yt = 
Z0
max is optimal if this setting is feasible under the
expectation of  ot+1 = 0, i.e., if 
u0  Z0max. The inequality is rewritten as:
   

1  2  1    (1 + )
1  

;
which is equivalent to the assumption in statement (i) of Proposition B1.
Given  y = Z0max and 
o = 0, ey; eos and eou are calculated as:
ey =
1
4

1 + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

; eos = eou =
1
2
;
which leads to:
Mup =

2

1  1
4

1 + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

;
Mdown =

8

1 + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

.
Direct calculation yields Mup  Mdown > 0.
(ii) Suppose that at time t; agents know that  yt = 
u0 and expect  ot+1 = 0. Then:
ut+1 = 1  ey
 
u0; 0

= 1  
2(1  )
> 1=2;
where the last inequality holds under Assumption 1. By (9), this implies that  ot+1 = 0,
fullling initial expectations. Therefore, there exists an unskilled-majority equilibrium
with no taxation on the old if the decisive voter nds it optimal to set  yt = 
u0.
To establish that setting  yt = 
u0 is optimal for the decisive voter, we rst note that
setting  yt = 
u0 is feasible if and only if  yt = 
u0  1, i.e.:
    
1   : (21)
This is the second assumption given in Proposition B1(ii).
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Second, setting  yt = argmaxyt 2[0;1] Z(
y
t ; 0) is infeasible if and only if 
Z0
max < 
u0; that
is:
 

1  21  (1 + )
1  

< : (22)
This is the rst assumption given in Proposition B1(ii). If (22) fails to hold,  yt = 
u0 is
dominated by  yt = 
Z0
max because Z(
y
t ; 0) is maximized at 
y
t = 
Z0
max.
Given conditions (21) and (22), the revenue from the young is illustrated in panel
(a) of Figure 3. The relevant payo function is Z( yt ; 0) for 
y
t   e and Z( yt ; 1) for
 yt  u1. Given the properties such that Z( yt ; 0) is increasing in  yt for  yt 2 (0;  e) with
 e   s0 and decreasing in  yt for  yt 2 (u0; 1); and argmaxZ( yt ; 1) = 1=2; an alternative
option is to choose (i)  yt = 
e under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0; or (ii) 
y
t = 1=2
under the expectation of  ot+1 = 1. The original option dominates the rst alternative
if Z(u0; 0)  Z( s0; 0) holds, i.e., if the second assumption in Proposition B1(ii) holds.
The original option dominates the second alternative if Z(u0; 0)  Z(1=2; 1) holds, i.e.,
if the third assumption in Proposition B1(ii) holds.
Given  y = u0 and  o = 0, ey; eos and eou are calculated as:
ey =

2(1  ) ; e
os = eou =
1
2
;
which leads to:
Mup =

2

1  
2(1  )

;Mdown =
()2
4(1  ) .
Direct calculation yields Mup  Mdown > 0. 
7.2 Unskilled-majority Equilibrium with Taxation on the Old
The next proposition provides a characterization of an unskilled-majority equilibrium with
taxation on the old.
Proposition B2:
Suppose that the following conditions hold:
  1
2 + 
;  <   1  (1 + )
1   ;
and:
(a)  >   
1   , or (b)    

1   and  <  

1  
4
  1  (1 + )
1  

:
There exists a set of unskilled-majority equilibria with taxation on the old such that
8t, T o is given by (9), U( yt ) is given by (12) and T y = 1=2. The equilibrium
outcome is unique, such that 8t,  y = 1=2;  o = 1; u = 3=4 and Mup = 0 < Mdown.
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Proof.
The rst assumption in the statement of Proposition B2,   1=(2 + ), is rewritten
as 1=2  u1. The assumption therefore implies that it is feasible to set  yt = 1=2 under
the expectation of  ot+1 = 1.
Suppose that at time t; agents know that  yt = 1=2 and expect that 
o
t+1 = 1. Then, 1 
ey(1=2; 1) = ut+1 = 3=4: By (9), this implies that  ot+1 = 1; fullling initial expectations.
Therefore, there exists an unskilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 1 if the decisive
voter nds it optimal to set  yt = 1=2.
To establish that setting  yt = 1=2 is optimal for the decisive voter, we rst note that
under the rst assumption, it always holds that Z0max < 
u0; because this inequality is
rewritten as:  1 + (2 + )
2(1  ) <
1
2


(1  )  (1  )
4

;
where the left-hand side is nonpositive as long as the rst assumption,   1=(2 + ),
holds, while the right-hand side is positive. Therefore, it is infeasible to set  yt = 
Z0
max
with the expectation of  ot+1 = 0 under the assumption of   1=(2 + ).
Given this result, there are two alternative options: setting  yt = 
e under the expec-
tation of  ot+1 = 0, and setting 
y
t = 
u0 under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0 provided that
this alternative option is feasible. The second assumption in the statement of Proposition
B2 is rewritten as  s0 < u1. Under this condition, there are multiple, self-fullling expec-
tations of agents as long as  yt   s0. The current option, ( yt ;  ot+1) = (1=2; 1), dominates
the rst alternative option, ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (
e; 0) as long as  e is set to be low such that
Z( e; 0) < Z(1=2; 1).
The rst part of the third assumption, denoted by (a), is rewritten as u0 > 1. Under
this condition, it is infeasible to choose the second alternative option ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (
u0; 0):
In contrast, under the second part of the third assumption, denoted by (b), the sec-
ond alternative option is feasible but does not dominate the current option because the
assumption (b) is rewritten as:
Z
 
u0; 0

< Z

1
2
; 1

:
With ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (1=2; 1), M
up and Mdown are calculated as Mup = 0 and Mdown =
=4. 
7.3 Skilled-majority Equilibrium with No Taxation on the Old
Having established the unskilled-majority equilibrium, we next provide the existence of a
skilled-majority equilibrium.
Proposition B3:
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(i) Suppose that the following condition holds:
 > max

  1  (1 + )
1   ;  

1  

:
There exists a set of skilled-majority equilibria with no taxation on the old such
that 8t, T o is given by (9), U( yt ) is given by (12) and T y =  s0. The equilibrium
outcome is unique, such that 8t,  y =  s0;  o = 0; u = 1=2 and Mup Mdown. The
equality of Mup = Mdown holds if and only if  = 1.
(ii) Suppose that the following conditions hold:
 >   
1   ;    
1  (1 + )
1   and    

1
4

:
There exists a set of skilled-majority equilibria with no taxation on the old such
that 8t, T o is given by (9), U( yt ) is given by (12) and T y =  e(  s0). The
equilibrium outcome is indeterminate, such that 8t,  y =  e;  o = 0; u = 1  
[(1   e) +  f(1  )  (1  )=4g] =2 and Mup ? Mdown if and only if  e ?
(1  )=(1 + ) +  s0.
Proof.
(i) Suppose that at time t; agents know that  yt = 
s0 and expect  ot+1 = 0. Then, 1 
ey( s0; 0) = ut+1 = 1=2: By (9), this implies that  ot+1 = 0, fullling initial expectations.
Therefore, there exists a skilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 0 if the decisive voter
nds it optimal to set  yt = 
s0.
To establish that setting  yt = 
s0 is optimal for the decisive voter, we rst note that
the rst assumption in statement (i) of Proposition B3,
 >   1  (1 + )
1   ;
is derived from the condition  s0 > u1. This condition implies that under the expectation
of  ot+1 = 0, the decisive voter can choose 
y
t = 
s0 irrespective of the expectation of  e.
The second assumption in statement (i) of Proposition B3,
 >   
1   ;
is rewritten as 1 < u0, implying that it is infeasible for the decisive voter to set the two
tax rates on the young,  yt = 
Z0
max and 
u0; demonstrated in Proposition B1, under the
expectation of  ot+1 = 0. Therefore, the available choice for the decisive voter is limited to
the range of [0;  s0] as long as he/she expects  ot+1 = 0. Given that Z(
y
t ; 0) is increasing
in  yt for that range, setting 
y
t = 
s0 is the revenue-maximizing behavior under the
expectation of  ot+1 = 0.
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Given ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (
s0; 0); we obtain ey = 1=2 and eou = eos = 1=2: Mup andMdown are
calculated asMup = (1 ey)eou = =4 andMdown = ey(1 eos) = =4. Mup Mdown
holds where an equality holds if and only if  = 1.
(ii) Suppose that at time t; agents know that  yt = 
e(  s0) and expect  ot+1 = 0.
Then, 1   ey( e; 0) = ut+1 < 1=2: By (9), this implies that  ot+1 = 0, fullling initial
expectations. Therefore, there exists a skilled-majority equilibrium with  ot+1 = 0 if the
decisive voter nds it optimal to set  yt = 
e.
To establish that setting  yt = 
e is optimal for the decisive voter, we rst note that the
rst assumption in statement (ii) of Proposition B3 is rewritten as 1 < u0, implying that
it is infeasible for the decisive voter to set the two tax rates on the young, demonstrated in
Proposition B1, under the expectation of  ot+1 = 0. Given that Z(
y
t ; 0) is increasing in 
y
t
for  yt 2 [0;  e), setting  yt =  e is the revenue-maximizing behavior under the expectation
of  ot+1 = 0 as long as [0; 
e) is a feasible range of  yt .
Given the above argument, the remaining alternative options for the decisive voter
are to set  yt = 
s0 irrespective of expectations on  yt under the expectation of 
o
t+1 = 0;
or to set  yt = argmaxZ(
y
t ; 1) = 1=2 under the expectation of 
o
t+1 = 1. The second
assumption in statement (ii) of Proposition B3 is rewritten as  s0  u1, implying that
the option of ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (
s0; 0) is unavailable for the decisive voter; otherwise, this
option dominates the current choice: Z ( s0; 0)  Z( e; 0).
The third assumption in statement (ii) ensures that there exists a  yt = 
e that sustains
the choice of ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (
e; 0) against the choice of ( yt ; 
o
t+1) = (1=2; 1) as an equilibrium:
Z( e; 0)  Z(1=2; 1). This inequality condition is rewritten as  e  ~ where:
~ 
1 +  f(1  )  (=4)  (1  )g  
q
[1 +  f(1  )  (=4)  (1  )g]2   1
2
=
1 +  s0  
q
[1 +  s0]2   1
2
As  e is bounded above  s0,  e must be set within the range [~ ;  s0] in order that Z( e; 0) 
Z(1=2; 1) holds. The third assumption ensures that the set [~ ;  s0] is nonempty.
Given that  y =  e and  o = 0, ey; eos and eou are calculated as:
Mup =

2

1  1
2

(1   e) + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

;
Mdown =

4

(1   e) + 

(1  )  (1  )
4

:
Direct calculation leads to Mup ?Mdown if and only if  e ? (1  )=(1 + ) +  s0. 
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Figure 1: The gure illustrates the timing of events and the distribution of the skilled
and the unskilled for generation t.
32
Figure 2: Panel (a) illustrates the case of  s0 < u1:  e is the highest tax rate that
produces the skilled majority. Panel (b) illustrates the case of  s0  u1:  s0 is the
highest tax rate that produces the skilled majority.
33
Figure 3: The unskilled-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old (panel (a));
the unskilled-majority equilibrium with taxation on the old (panel (b)); and the skilled-
majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old (panel (c)).
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Figure 4: The gure displays the set of parameters (; ), where  is xed at 0:8, classied
according to the characterization of political equilibria. The parameter  is dened by
  1
(1 )  
4
(1 ) .
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Figure 5: The gure displays the set of parameters (; ), where  is xed at 0:4, classied
according to the characterization of political equilibria.
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Figure 6: Solid curves and shaded area depict how the parameter  aects the downward
mobility (panel (a)) and the upward mobility (panel (b)) in the political equilibria. Dotted
curves depict the corresponding values in the Ramsey allocation investigated in Section
4.
Figure 7: Solid curves and shaded area depict how the parameter  aects the downward
mobility (panel (a)) and the upward mobility (panel (b)) in the political equilibria. Dotted
curves M jR (j = down; up) depict the corresponding values in the Ramsey allocation
investigated in Section 4. In particular, M jR

<
and M jR

>
denote the numbers of
mobility when  <  and  > , respectively.
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